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The record volumes of gas supplied via the OPAL and Nord Stream pipeline in recent weeks 
have been accompanied by controversy over the rules for utilisation of the OPAL pipeline’s 
capacity. There has long been uncertainty as to the actual content of the decision taken by 
the European Commission at the end of October 2016, the full text of which was published 
on 9 January 2017. Both the clash of interests between companies and states about how to 
use the gas pipeline, and the different interpretations of the impact of Gazprom’s increased 
utilisation of OPAL due to the new EC regulations on the situation on the gas markets in 
the EU, including in Central Europe and Poland, have been revealed. Uncertainty concerning 
the principles of the pipeline’s use has also been increased by Poland’s formal challenge of 
the EC’s decision. 
The decisions by the European Court of Justice and a court in Düsseldorf related to this mat-
ter, which temporarily suspend the implementation of the EC’s regulations, have not yet been 
published. This deepens the doubts about the principles for increased utilisation of the OPAL 
pipeline, and about the legality of the increase in gas flows along the route which has been 
apparent since 22 December. At the same time, these gas flows are affecting the situation on 
the European (and especially Central European) gas markets. OPAL’s record fill-up translates 
to a record usage of the Nord Stream pipeline, as well as an increase in the role of Germa-
ny and the Czech Republic in the transit of Russian gas to the EU, especially to Central and 
Eastern Europe. This in turn affects the changes in gas flows in the Central European region, 
and reduces the transit role of Slovakia and Ukraine. 
The increase in the utilisation of the OPAL pipeline, which changes the situation on the Central 
European gas markets , raises questions about how to increase these markets’ competitive-
ness and supply security. The controversies connected with the principles of using the pipeline 
reflect more substantial controversies within the EU concerning the key challenges and objec-
tives of the EU’s security of gas supplies policy, in particular the role which should be played 
by Gazprom and deliveries of Russian gas, as well as the particular delivery routes. The EC’s 
interpretation of security of gas supplies visible in its October decision seems to be closer to 
the position of the supporters of normalisation, or even reinforcement of gas  cooperation 
with Russia (by implementing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, among others), despite the existing 
disputes at the political level, as well as of strengthening the role of Germany on the Central 
European gas market. 
The OPAL pipeline: controversies about the rules 
for its use and the question of supply security 
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The legal situation
At the request of the German regulator BNet-
zA, and after years of negotiations, on 28 Octo-
ber 2016 the European Commission announced 
new rules for the use of the OPAL gas pipeline 
(see the Appendix; for more, see Agata Łoskot- 
-Strachota, ‘The European Commission enables 
increased use of the OPAL pipeline by Gaz-
prom’, OSW Commentary, 9 November 2016). 
The full text of the EC’s decision was only pub-
lished on 9 January, which raised a series of 
questions about the publication procedure and 
transparency of the whole process, and about 
the details and consequences of the decision 
for the parties concerned, including actors from 
Poland and Ukraine. Even before the EC’s de-
cision was published, the parties interested in 
how the pipeline was to be utilised had already 
taken a number of steps. On the one hand, on 
28 November, the conditions  of OPAL’s use 
were adapted to the EC’s new regulations by 
the pipeline operator, and on 19 December the 
first capacity auctions based on these rules 
were held (see below). On the other hand, the 
Polish gas company PGNiG and the Polish gov-
ernment applied to have the implementation 
of the EC’s decision halted, and challenged it 
at the European Court of Justice, deeming it 
a threat to the competitiveness and security of 
gas supplies to Poland and the whole of Central 
& Eastern Europe. PGNiG also lodged a com-
plaint with a court in Düsseldorf, Germany. 
As a consequence, according to PGNiG’s 
statement, on 23 December the EU Court of 
Justice ordered a temporary halt to the im-
plementation of the EC’s decision concern-
ing OPAL, and requested additional clarifi-
cation from the parties to the proceedings, 
i.e. PGNiG and the EC. After this is clarified, 
the Court is supposed to take a final decision 
as to the possibility of maintaining the sus-
pension of the application of the EC decision 
until the plaintiff’s case has been considered. 
A week later, on 30 December, a similar decision 
was taken by the court in Düsseldorf, and the 
German regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BntezA) 
implemented it; this move should result in the 
temporary suspension of any further capacity 
auctions based on the new rules (see table in 
Appendix). 
The main confusion on the rules of use of OPAL’s 
capacity as of 19 December concerns currently 
the following issues:
• what were the legal bases for the use of 
OPAL’s capacity between 23 December (when 
the Court of Justice issued the temporary halt 
to the implementation of the EC’s decision) and 
30 December (the date of the decision by the 
court in Düsseldorf and its implementation by 
BNetzA);
• whether, in accordance with the generally ac-
cepted standards, the proceedings at the court 
in Düsseldorf are to be consistent with the pro-
ceedings currently before the Court of Justice, 
and whether the German court’s final decision 
will be taken before or after the EU court’s final 
decision is issued;
• whether the Court of Justice’s decision means 
the suspension of the organisation of further 
auctions as of the moment of its issue, or 
whether it also affects the way in which the 
OPAL pipeline should be used from that date 
(at present OPAL is being used according to the 
new regulations, to almost its full capacity);
• how long the Court of Justice (and the 
German court) will maintain the (currently tem-
porary) suspension of the implementation of 
the EC’s decision on OPAL.
The publication procedure of the Europe-
an Commission’s decision and its chal-
lenge by Poland raise doubts regarding 
the current rules for OPAL’s use.
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Auctions and gas flows via OPAL
OPAL is a pipeline in which the capacity booked 
at the point of entry may vary from the capacity 
booked at the point of exit. This is because some 
of the gas from OPAL may be sold via Gaspool 
without any concrete points of exit being booked. 
In addition, OPAL has a physical connection 
with the Jagal and Ontras networks, and can 
thus transfer some gas in either direction. Con-
sequently, in the case of OPAL, volumes of gas 
that enter the pipeline at  Greifswald usually 
differ from those which exit at Brandov. In par-
ticular, until recently, due to the supplementary 
filling with gas flowing from the Gaspool area, 
it regularly occurred that more gas exited the 
pipeline at the Czech/German border than had 
entered it in northern Germany (see Appendix, 
Figure 1, for the period from 1 to 22 December).
Since 22 December, the increase in gas trans-
fers via the OPAL pipeline has become clear (see 
Appendix, Figure 1): 
• at the Greifswald entry point, from a daily 
average of 59.4 mcm during 1–22 December 
(the equivalent of 20.5 bcm annually), to levels 
sometimes in excess of 100 mcm per day (the 
equivalent of 34.6 bcm annually);
• at the Brandov exit point, from an average 
of 64.5 mcm per day during 1–22 December 
(the equivalent of 22.3 bcm annually), to levels 
sometimes in excess of 90 mcm/day (equivalent 
to 31.1 bcm annually).
• Only on 31 December 2016 was a temporary 
decline in the pipeline’s use apparent. 
According to information from the pipeline oper-
ator OPAL Gastransport, on 19 December OPAL 
capacity auctions based on the rules adapted to 
the EC decision of 28 October 2016 were held 
at the PRISMA platform. The data from PRIS-
MA shows that at 9 am on 19 December, new 
monthly products, most probably adapted to 
the new rules, were offered and sold:
a. at the Greifswald entry point, the operator 
OPAL Gastransport sold 12.66 GWh/h of the 
15.86 GWh/h of the capacity available for the 
whole of January (the so-called Greifswald 
OPAL partly regulated);
b. at the Brandov exit point:
• the operators Net4Gas and OPAL Gastrans-
port sold 2.63 GWh/h of the 5.83 GWh/h as 
part of the monthly bundled product (Brandov 
Opal bundle);
• OPAL Gastransport sold 100% of 10.03 GWh/h 
for the entire month (Brandov Opal partly reg-
ulated);
• according to reports from Energate1, the oper-
ators Net4Gas and OPAL Gastransport also of-
fered a bundled product corresponding to 10% 
of the pipeline capacity belonging to OPAL’s op-
erator, although none of the 3.2 GWh/h was sold. 
The capacities sold at Greifswald equal the sum 
of the capacities sold at Brandov, and come to 
around 28.5 mcm per day (and 10 bcm annually).
In the interpretation of the media and the en-
ergy market intelligence providers, all of the 
capacities sold were most likely bought by Gaz-
prom. In connection with the suspension of the 
next auctions until the final judgement by the 
court in Düsseldorf on PGNiG’s complaint, and 
the lack of legal certainty as regards both the 
duration of the suspension and a final judge-
ment on the complaints by the Polish side, it 
is not known whether the next auctions of the 
above-mentioned monthly products will take 
place in January/February. It is known that 
auctions at PRISMA of the same capacities are 
scheduled for 6 March 2017, but for a much 
longer period – most likely a period of 15 years 
(the maximum allowed by EU regulations), bro-
ken up into one-year ‘pieces’2.
1 Cf. Gasmarkt 1/17, H. Lochmann, Energate, January, 2017.
2 ibidem
Since the new rules for OPAL’s use were im-
plemented, gas flows via Nord Stream have 
risen to record levels, sometimes exceeding 
100% of the route’s capacity.
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The capacities sold at auction on 19 December 
for the whole of January explain (leaving aside 
the current legal doubts) the rise in gas flows via 
OPAL as of 1 January. Consequently, the pipeline 
has seen record levels of usage, and the same 
is also true for the Nord Stream gas pipeline. 
According to media reports, in early January 
Gazprom supplied 165.2 mcm of gas per day via 
its Baltic Sea route, using more than 100% of 
the total technical capacity of the Nord Stream 
pipeline during 4–6 January.
The sharp drop in flows on 31 December was 
most likely because German regulator’s deci-
sion to stop the OPAL capacity auctions (see 
table in Appendix) had come into force on the 
previous day (30 December). Nevertheless, it is 
still unclear why the increase in flows on 22–30 
December was just as sharply marked, and on 
what basis it took place (for example, whether 
it was connected with the use of capacities un-
used throughout the year on the basis of the 
old regulations, or with the daily auctions or-
ganised according to the new regulations).
OPAL and gas flows in Central Europe 
and Ukraine
The increase in gas flows via the OPAL and Nord 
Stream pipelines has had a direct impact on the 
amounts and directions of gas transmission via 
other routes in Central & Eastern Europe. Above 
all, this has influenced the transit of gas via the 
Ukrainian route – a key alternative to the Nord 
Stream route for supplying Russian gas to Eu-
rope. The daily volume of gas transmission via 
Ukraine at the key border point in Veľké Ka-
pušany (Slovakia) fell from around 160 mcm (22 
December) to 117 mcm (25 December), a drop 
of over 25%, and then began to rise again (see 
Appendix, Figure 2). 
At the time of writing (16 January), the flows via 
Veľké Kapušany are lower by around 10 mcm 
per day from the level they stood at prior to the 
increase of flow via OPAL. At the same time, 
however, due to the low temperatures in Eu-
rope, it is likely this level is primarily related to 
greater demand for Russian gas and the lack of 
alternative opportunities for Gazprom to sup-
ply it, as the Russian company is already using 
Nord Stream’s maximum available capacity. If 
no additional capacities were made available in 
OPAL, transit via Ukraine would be significantly 
larger as this route has started to be used as the 
‘last-resort option’. Similarly, there has been 
a temporary drop in gas supplies via Slovakia 
to Baumgarten in Austria. The most obvious 
change resulting from the increase in the use of 
OPAL, however, is visible in the flow of gas via 
the border point at Lanžhot between Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic; whereas before 22 De-
cember much more gas had flowed from Slova-
kia to the Czech Republic, at present the situa-
tion has reversed, and more gas is flowing from 
the Czech Republic to Slovakia (and probably 
onwards, to Baumgarten and other points). 
It is thus clear that the immediate effect of the 
increased utilisation of OPAL is a strengthening 
of the role of not only Germany but also the 
Czech Republic in the transit of Russian gas, 
partially at Slovakia’s expense. In addition, the 
relative importance of Ukraine as a transit corri-
dor for gas to the EU is decreasing. The Ukraini-
an route is increasingly being used as an option 
of last resort when demand for gas peaks and 
there is no access to alternative export routes. 
At the same time, the larger deliveries via OPAL 
are associated with the greater availability of 
Russian gas in Germany (including at Gaspool) 
and in the Czech Republic, which may affect 
gas prices there. 
The transit of gas via Slovakia to Ukraine (via 
Budince, which is currently the most important 
gas supply route onto the Ukrainian market) 
has seen only minimal declines. At the same 
The rise in OPAL’s use has increased the 
transit importance of Germany and the 
Czech Republic, and reduced the role of 
Slovakia and Ukraine.
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time, however, the question remains open as 
to whether changes in routes, directions and 
volumes of gas flows from Russia in Central Eu-
rope may affect the availability and price com-
petitiveness of EU gas supplies to Ukraine. 
OPAL and the competitiveness 
and security of gas supplies to the EU
The changes already visible in the pattern of gas 
flows through Central & Eastern Europe show that 
increasing Gazprom’s access to OPAL and the pos-
sibility of it using the pipeline to a greater extent 
will affect the situation in gas markets around the 
region, in Germany, and indirectly throughout the 
EU. In addition to that the increase in Gazprom’s 
use of OPAL could have a significant effect on the 
Central European and Ukrainian gas markets, for 
the following reasons: 
• the EC’s ongoing antitrust proceedings 
against Gazprom which is allegedly abusing its 
dominant position on the gas markets of Cen-
tral & Eastern Europe;
• the EU’s ambitious foreign and gas policy 
objectives with regard to Ukraine, including 
the tripartite talks initiated annually by the EC 
aimed at ensuring the stability of gas supplies 
via Ukraine to the EU and to Ukraine itself.
Meanwhile, the justification of the EC’s decision 
primarily presents an assessment of how an in-
crease in the use of OPAL will affect the security 
and competitiveness of supplies and the func-
tioning of the market in the Czech Republic. In 
addition, although it admits the significant rise 
in Gazprom’s use of OPAL could have a nega-
tive effect on competition in the Czech Repub-
lic, the opinion expresses the hope that this will 
be mitigated by other positive effects of the 
new regulations for the pipeline’s use3. The EC 
envisions a particularly substantial role here for 
the option (guaranteed by the EC’s decision) for 
third parties to reserve a minimum of 10% of 
3 Cf. para. 112-114, Comission Decision  of 28.10.2016 on 
review of exemption of the Ostseepipelime-Anbindung-
sleitung from requirements of third party access and 
tariff regulation granted under Directive 2003/55/EC, 
Brussels 28.10.206, C(2016) 6950 final.
OPAL’s capacity (via Gaspool). At the same time, 
at the first auction of OPAL’s capacities no inter-
est was expressed in the OPAL capacities fore-
cast for the third parties; it is uncertain whether 
such interest will arise in the future. Nor is it 
clear how, in such a situation, the EC intends to 
counterbalance the increasingly strong position 
of Gazprom in supplies to the Czech market. 
The EC’s decision also de facto supports the 
development and importance of the role 
of Germany, and in particular the Gaspool 
market area, in the gas trade in both the EU 
and Central & Eastern Europe. In the opinion 
of the Commission, one of the beneficial effects 
of its decisions is the increased integration of 
the Czech market with the increasingly liquid 
Gaspool area. In this way, the EC’s decision has 
indirectly hampered further implementation 
of alternative projects for regional integration 
(such as the V4). 
Allowing Gazprom to make greater use of OPAL 
indirectly ties the development of Gaspool to 
the boosting of Gazprom’s role in Germany 
and the region, as well as to larger supplies of 
gas from Russia (particularly in the context 
of declining production in the Netherlands and 
the North Sea). This partnership is reinforced 
by Germany’s already strong commitment to 
Gazprom (gas pipelines, storage facilities, gas 
trading etc.) and by plans to boost these ties 
even further (Nord Stream 2). However, the EC’s 
decision contains no analysis of the benefits 
and risks associated with such a link between 
the development of a key gas market in the EU 
with cooperation with the Russian-controlled 
gas company, the world’s largest – including 
any analysis of the effects on the German, re-
gional and EU gas markets, and the impact on 
the shape and the independence of EU energy 
and foreign policy in this area. In support of 
its decision, meanwhile, the EC estimates4 that 
the increased use of OPAL will lead to increased 
security of gas supplies to the EU, thanks 
among other factors to the availability of ad-
4 Cf. para. 49-53, Comission Decision, op.cit.
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ditional transfer capacities, irrespective of the 
apparent tendency by Nord Stream (and OPAL) 
to increase supplies at the expense of transit 
through Ukraine.
In consequence, the EC’s decision seems to 
make up part of one – but not the only – way 
of thinking on how to improve the security of 
gas supplies to the EU presented, among oth-
ers, by gas companies and states (such as Ger-
many) which support the implementation of 
the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. In this concept, 
larger imports of Russian gas are intended to 
guarantee the long-term stability and security 
of gas supplies, potentially low costs, and spe-
cific economic benefits for the states or compa-
nies involved in direct cooperation with Russia 
and Gazprom. Therefore, emphasis is placed on 
normalising the gas relationship with Russia, 
despite current misunderstandings at the polit-
ical level (Ukraine, Syria). 
Meanwhile, an alternative current of thought 
about supply security exists within the EU, one 
characteristic of Central European states (for 
example, Poland and Lithuania). In this way of 
thinking, significant dependence on gas im-
ports from Russia (as shown by previous experi-
ences, not only concerning supplies via Ukraine) 
is associated with the real risk of disruption; 
also, Russian gas might still be expensive, espe-
cially as long as Gazprom remains the dominant 
supplier. In this approach, it is noteworthy that 
gas markets do not operate in a vacuum, and 
fuel questions happen to be related to foreign 
and security policy issues. Those EU countries 
which consider supply security along these lines 
are cautious about reinforcing the gas relation-
ship with Russia, especially in the context of the 
ongoing conflict in Ukraine; they see the diver-
sification of supply sources and the reduction 
of dependence on Russian gas as priorities for 
supply security. The EC’s adoption in its decision 
on OPAL of a different interpretation of the key 
policy objectives of the security of gas supply in 
the region may consequently cause complaints 
that it is biased, which will shake trust in the 
EU’s institutions. 
APPENDIX
Figure 1. The use of the OPAL gas pipeline (physical flows at the Greifswald entry  
               point, and the exit point in Brandov) in December 2016 and January 2017
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Figure 2. Gas flows through key points of the Slovak network,  
               in December 2016 and January 2017 
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- alters the previously operational decision by 
the EC from July 2009
- establishes exemption from the third-party 
access (TPA) rule at 50% of pipeline’s ‘transit’ 
capacity
- increases Gazprom’s access to the OPAL pipe-
line’s ‘transit’ capacity to as much as 90% 
- commits parties to hold auctions of capacity 
non-exempt from TPA regulation,
and obliges parties wishing to reserve addition-
al capacity (Gazprom) to participate in these 
auctions
- allows third parties access to a minimum of 
10% of capacity (via Gaspool)
- promotes greater integration of the Czech 
market with Gaspool and the German market
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- adjusts the four-way agreement from 11 May 
to the EC’s provisions of 28 October
- forms the basis for changes to the terms of use 
of the OPAL pipeline by its operator, and for the 
start of auctions
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agreement (original
and amended)
PG
N
iG
’s
 c
om
p
la
in
t
to
 t
he
 E
U
’s
 C
ou
rt
 o
f 
Ju
st
ic
e
4 
D
ec
em
b
er
 2
01
6
- complaint concerning the EC’s decision of 28 
October, lodged by PGNiG Supply & Trading 
GmbH, operating on the German market; and a 
request for an immediate halt to its implemen-
tation
- the allegations of a breach by the EC of the 
Treaty on the EU, the Treaty on the function-
ing of the EU, and Directive 2009/73/EC on the 
common principles of the internal gas market
- according to PGNiG, the EC’s decision on OPAL 
is a challenge to market competitiveness and 
the security of gas supplies to Poland and Cen-
tral & Eastern Europe
- the exact wording 
of the complaint, including 
14 allegations and discrimi-
natory conditions in the de-
cision taken by the EC
Legal documents regarding current rules for the OPAL gas pipeline’s capacity use
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Documents Dates Basic points Unclear or unknown 
issuesIssued Published
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- PGNiG and PGNiG Supply & Trading GmbH 
complain to the German court in Düsseldorf 
about the four-party agreement between 
BNetzA, OPAL, Gazprom and Gazprom Export, 
adapted to conform with the EC’s decision of 28 
October, to exempt Gazprom from the principle 
of third-party access to OPAL
- PGNiG lodges a complaint after BNetzA rejects 
its 4 proposals (to publish the text of the deci-
sion; to initiate a proper administrative proce-
dure compatible with
German law; to include PGNiG
in the proceedings undertaken by the 
Bundesnetzagentur to withdraw from the four-
way agreement)
26 November–15 December 2016
- no details of the complaint 
from PGNiG
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- the EC’s decision threatens the diversification of 
sources and supply routes as well as the security 
of supplies to the EU, especially Central Europe 
and Poland, in connection with the increasing role 
of one source (Russia) and one supply route
- Foreign Ministry also accuses the EC of violating 
principles of energy solidarity
- no content of the com-
plaint (a dispatch from the 
Polish Press Agency avail-
able on the Foreign Minis-
try’s website)
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-According to information provided by PGNiG, 
the Court decided to suspend the implementa-
tion of the EC’s decision of 28 October; at the 
same time it asked the EC to clarify the details 
of the auction of OPAL capacity, and asked 
PGNiG Supply & Trading to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the impact of the EC’s decision on 
the security and competitiveness of gas sup-
plies to Poland
- The Court has not yet pub-
lished the content of its de-
cision
Pr
ov
is
io
na
l d
ec
is
io
n 
of
 t
he
 
co
ur
t 
in
 D
üs
se
ld
or
f
30
 D
ec
em
b
er
 2
01
6
- temporary halt to implementation of the new 
regulations concerning utilisation of the OPAL 
pipeline’s capacity (and by extension the hold-
ing of subsequent auctions) as of December 30 
until a final decision is taken
- most likely is a direct response to the com-
plaint by PGNiG lodged in this court
- not published
- unclear how the proceed-
ings in the Düsseldorf court 
are connected to the EU’s 
Court of Justice proceedings, 
and in particular, whether 
the court in Düsseldorf will 
suspend consideration of the 
case until the end of the pro-
ceedings conducted by the 
Court of Justice
Th
e 
d
ec
is
io
n 
of
 t
he
 
G
er
m
an
 r
eg
ul
at
or
 
BN
et
zA
3 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
10
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
01
7
- in connection with the decision of the court 
in Düsseldorf of 30 December, resulting from 
the Court of Justice’s decision of 23 December, 
BNetzA has since 30 December temporarily 
banned the application of the EC’s decision of 
28 October and the holding of subsequent auc-
tions on OPAL’s capacity
- which regulations for the 
auction of OPAL’s capacity 
have been in effect from the 
ECJ’s decision (23 Decem-
ber) until the decision of the 
court in Düsseldorf and its 
implementation
(30 December)
Author’s compilation based on sources available in the media, the companies’ websites, 
and industry bulletins
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